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1  Hyperhistory
More people are alive today than ever before in the evolution of humanity. And 
more of us live longer and better today than ever before. To a large measure, we owe 
this to our technologies, at least insofar as we develop and use them intelligently, 
peacefully, and sustainably.
Sometimes, we may forget how much we owe to flints and wheels, to sparks and 
ploughs, to engines and satellites. We are reminded of such deep technological debt 
when we divide human life into prehistory and history. That significant threshold is 
there to acknowledge that it was the invention and development of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) that made all the difference between who we 
were and who we are. It is only when the lessons learnt by past generations began 
to evolve in a Lamarckian rather than a Darwinian way that humanity entered into 
history.
History has lasted 6,000 years, since it began with the invention of writing in the 
fourth millennium BC. During this relatively short time, ICTs have provided the 
recording and transmitting infrastructure that made the escalation of other technolo-
gies possible, with the direct consequence of furthering our dependence on more 
and more layers of technologies. ICTs became mature in the few centuries between 
Guttenberg and Turing. Today, we are experiencing a radical transformation in our 
ICTs that could prove equally significant, for we have started drawing a new thresh-
old between history and a new age, which may be aptly called hyperhistory (Fig. 1). 
Let me explain.
Prehistory and history work like adverbs: they tell us how people live, not when 
or where. From this perspective, human societies currently stretch across three ages, 
as ways of living. According to reports about an unspecified number of uncontacted 
tribes in the Amazonian region (http://www.survivalinternational.org/), there are 
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still some societies that may be living prehistorically, without recorded documents. 
If one day such tribes disappear, the end of the first chapter of our evolutionary 
book will have been written. The greatest majority of people today still live his-
torically, in societies that rely on ICTs to record and transmit data of all kinds. In 
such historical societies, ICTs have not yet overtaken other technologies, especially 
energy-related ones, in terms of their vital importance. Then there are some people 
around the world who are already living hyperhistorically, in societies or environ-
ments where ICTs and their data processing1 capabilities are the necessary condi-
tion for the maintenance and any further development of societal welfare, personal 
well-being, as well as overall flourishing. The nature of conflicts provides a sad test 
for the reliability of this tripartite interpretation of human evolution. Only a society 
that lives hyperhistorically can be vitally threatened informationally, by a cyber 
attack. Only those who live by the digit may die by the digit (Floridi and Taddeo 
forthcoming).
To summarise, human evolution may be visualised as a three-stage rocket: in 
prehistory, there are no ICTs; in history, there are ICTs, they record and transmit 
data, but human societies depend mainly on other kinds of technologies concerning 
primary resources and energy; in hyperhistory, there are ICTs, they record, trans-
mit and, above all, process data, increasingly autonomously, and human societies 
become vitally dependent on them and on information as a fundamental resource. 
Added-value moves from being ICT-related to being ICT-dependent.
1 This is the way I understand the reference in the Manifesto to a computational turn.
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Fig. 1  From prehistory to hyperhistory
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If all this is even approximately correct, the emergence from its historical age 
represents one of the most significant steps taken by humanity for a very long time. 
It certainly opens up a vast horizon of opportunities as well as challenges, all essen-
tially driven by the recording, transmitting, and processing powers of ICTs. From 
synthetic biochemistry to neuroscience, from the Internet of things to unmanned 
planetary explorations, from green technologies to new medical treatments, from 
social media to digital games, from agricultural to financial applications, from eco-
nomic developments to the energy industry, our activities of discovery, invention, 
design, control, education, work, socialisation, entertainment, care and so forth 
would be not only unfeasible but unthinkable in a purely mechanical, historical 
context. They are all hyperhistorical in nature.
It follows that we are witnessing the outlining of a macroscopic scenario in 
which an exponential growth of new inventions, applications, and solutions in ICTs 
are quickly detaching future generations from ours. Of course, this is not to say that 
there is no continuity, both backward and forward. Backward, because it is often 
the case that the deeper a transformation is, the longer and more widely rooted its 
causes are. It is only because many different forces have been building the pressure 
for a very long time that radical changes may happen all of a sudden, perhaps unex-
pectedly. It is not the last snowflake that breaks the branch of the tree. In our case, it 
is certainly history that begets hyperhistory. There is no ASCII without the alphabet. 
Forward, because it is most plausible that historical societies will survive for a long 
time in the future, not unlike the Amazonian tribes mentioned above. Despite glo-
balisation, human societies do not parade uniformly forward, in synchronic steps.
2  The Philosophy of Information Policies
Given the unprecedented novelties that the dawn of hyperhistory is causing, it is not 
surprising that many of our fundamental philosophical views, so entrenched in his-
tory and above all so modern (in the sense of this word explained in the Manifesto), 
may need to be upgraded, if not entirely replaced. Perhaps not yet in academia, 
think tanks, research centres, or R&D offices, but clearly in the streets and on-
line, there is an atmosphere of confused expectancy, of exciting, sometimes naïve, 
bottom-up changes in our views about (i) the world, (ii) about ourselves, (iii) about 
our interactions with the world and (iv) among ourselves.
These four focus points are not the result of research programmes, nor of the 
impact of successful grant applications. Much more realistically and powerfully, 
but also more confusedly and tentatively, the changes in our Weltanschauung are 
the result of our daily adjustments, intellectually and behaviourally, to a reality that 
is fluidly changing in front of our eyes and under our feet, exponentially and relent-
lessly. In the Manifesto, I described this state in terms of “building the raft while 
swimming”, hacking Neurath’s famous analogy. We are finding our new balance 
by shaping and adapting to hyperhistorical conditions that have not yet sedimented 
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into a mature age, and in which novelties are no longer disruptive but finally stable 
patterns of “more of approximately the same” (think, for example, of the car or the 
book industry, and the stability they have provided).
It is for this reason that the following terminology is only tentative and probably 
inadequate for capturing the intellectual novelty that we are facing. Our very con-
ceptual vocabulary and our ways of making sense of the world (our semanticising 
processes and practices) need to be reconsidered and redesigned in order to provide 
us with a better grasp of our hyperhistorical age, and hence a better chance to shape 
it in the best way and deal with its challenges successfully. With this proviso in 
mind, it seems clear that a new philosophy of history, which tries to makes sense 
of our age as the end of history and the beginning of hyperhistory, invites the de-
velopment of (see the fours points above) (i) a new philosophy of nature, (ii) a new 
philosophical anthropology, (iii) a synthetic e-nvironmentalism as a bridge between 
us and the world, and (iv) a new philosophy of politics among us.
In other contexts, I have argued that such an invitation amounts to a request for a 
new philosophy of information that can work at 360 degrees on our hyperhistorical 
condition (Floridi 2011). I have sought to develop a philosophy of nature in terms 
of a philosophy of the infosphere (Floridi 2003), and a philosophical anthropology 
in terms of a fourth revolution in our self-understanding—after the Copernican, 
the Darwinian, and Freudian ones—that re-interprets humans as informational or-
ganisms living and interacting with other informational agents in the infosphere 
 (Floridi 2008, 2010). Finally, I have suggested that an expansion of environmental 
ethics to all environments—including those that are artificial, digital or synthetic—
should be based on an information ethics for the whole infosphere (Floridi forth-
coming). What I have not done is to outline a philosophy of politics consistent with 
such initial steps. The following remarks represent the beginning of this new effort.
3  Political Apoptosis: from the Historical State  
to the Hyperhistorical MASs
The long-term perspective, introduced in the previous section, should help to 
explain the process of political apoptosis2 that we are undergoing, to borrow a 
concept from cell biology: the State developed by becoming more and more an In-
formation Society, but in so doing it increasingly made itself less and less the main 
information agent, because what made the State possible and then predominant, 
2 Apoptosis (also known as programmed cell death) is a natural and normal form of self-destruc-
tion in which a programmed sequence of events leads to the elimination of cells. Apoptosis plays 
a crucial role in developing and maintaining the health of the body by eliminating cells once they 
become old, unnecessary, or unhealthy. I am indebted to Judith Simon for having warned me 
against the dangerous overtones in the concept, with its potential connection to Nazi views about 
biological purity and purification. Of course this is not the way the concept should be understood 
here, I have just been unable to find a better way of expressing the idea so far.
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as a historical driving force in human politics, namely ICTs, is also what is now 
making it less central hyperhistorically, in the social, political and economic life of 
humanity across the world (Fig. 2). Three related reasons are worth highlighting by 
way of explanation.
1. Power: ICTs “democratise” data and the processing/controlling power over 
them, in the sense that both now tend to reside and multiply in a multitude of 
repositories and sources, thus creating and empowering a potentially bound-
less number of non-state agents, from the single individual to associations and 
groups, from macro-agents, like multinationals, to international, intergovern-
mental as well as nongovernmental, organisations. The State is no longer the 
only, and sometimes not even the main, agent in the political arena that can 
exercise informational power over other informational agents, in particular over 
(groups of) human informational organisms. The European Commission, for 
example, recognised the importance of such new agents in the Cotonou Agree-
ment3 between the European Union (EU) and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries, by acknowledging the important role exercised by a wide range 
of nongovernmental development actors, and formally recognising their partici-
pation in ACP-EU development cooperation. According to Art. 6 of the Cotonou 
Agreement, such non-state actors comprise: “the private sector; economic and 
social partners, including trade union organisations; civil society in all its forms, 
according to national characteristics”.4 The phenomenon is generating a new 
tension between power and force, where power is informational and exercised 
through the elaboration and dissemination of norms, whereas force is physical 
3 See Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, Agreed Consolidated Text, 11 March 2010. http://
ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.
pdf.
4 I am grateful to Mireille Hildebrandt for calling my attention to this document.
Fig. 2  From the State to the MASs
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and exercised when power fails to orient the behaviour of the relevant agents and 
norms need to be enforced.
2. Space: ICTs de-territorialise human experience. They have made regional bor-
ders porous or in some cases entirely irrelevant. They have also created, and are 
exponentially expanding, regions of the infosphere where an increasing number 
of agents (not only people, see above) operate and spend more and more time. 
Such regions are intrinsically stateless. This is generating a new tension between 
geo-politics, which is global and non-territorial, and the Nation State, which still 
defines its identity and political legitimacy in terms of a sovereign territorial 
unit, as a Country.
3. Organisation: ICTs fluidify the topology of politics. ICTs do not merely enable 
but actually promote the agile, temporary and timely aggregation, disaggregation 
and re-aggregation of distributed (Floridi forthcoming) groups around shared 
interests across old, rigid boundaries, represented by social classes, political par-
ties, ethnicity, language barriers, and so forth. This is generating a new tensions 
between the Nation State, still understood as a major organisational institution, 
yet no longer monolithic but increasingly morphing into a multiagent system 
itself (see below), and a variety of equally powerful, indeed sometimes even 
more politically influential (with respect to the old Nation State) and powerful 
(see above), non-State organisations. The debate on direct democracy is thus 
reshaped. We used to think that it was about how the Nation State could re-orga-
nise itself internally, by designing rules and having the means to promote forms 
of democracy in which citizens could vote on policy initiatives directly almost 
in real time. We thought of it as a complementary alternative to forms of repre-
sentative democracy. The reality is that direct democracy has become a media-
led democracy, in which multiagent systems (understood as distributed groups 
temporary and timely aggregated around shared interests) have multiplied and 
become sources of influence external to the Nation State. Citizens vote for their 
representatives and influence them via opinion polls.
Because of 1–3, the unique position of the historical State as the information agent 
is being undermined from below and overridden from above by the emergence of 
multiagent systems or MASs, which have the data, the power (and sometimes even 
the force, as in the case of cyber threats), the space, and the organisational flexibility 
to erode its political clout, steal its authority and, in the long run, make it redundant 
in contexts where it was once the only or the predominant informational agent. The 
recent Greek crisis and the actual agents involved in its management offer a good 
template: the Greek Government and the Greek State had to interact “above” with 
the EU, the European Central Bank, the IMF, the rating agencies, and so forth, and 
“below” with the Greek mass media and the people in Syntagma square, the finan-
cial markets and international investors, German public opinion, and so forth.
A much more networked idea of political interactions makes possible a degree 
of tolerance towards, and indeed feasibility of, localisms, separatisms, as well as 
movements and parties favouring autonomy or independence that would have 
been inconceivable in Modern times. From Padania (Italy) to Catalonia (Spain), 
from Scotland (Great Britain) to Bavaria (Germany), one is reminded that almost 
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in any European country, for example, hyperhistorical trends may resemble pre-
Westphalian equilibria.5
Of course, the historical State is not giving up its role without a fight. In many 
contexts, it is trying to reclaim its primacy as the information super-agent governing 
the political life of the society that it organises. In some cases, the attempt is blatant: 
Labour Government’s failed plan to introduce compulsory ID in the UK6 should 
be read from this perspective. In many cases, it is “historical resistance” by stealth, 
as when an information society—defined by the essential role played by intellec-
tual, intangible assets (knowledge-based economy), information-intensive services 
(business and property services, finance and insurance), and public sectors (espe-
cially education, public administration and health care)—is largely run by the State, 
which simply maintains its role of major informational agent no longer just legally, 
on the basis of its power over legislation and its implementation, but now also eco-
nomically, on the basis of its power over the majority of information-based jobs. 
The intrusive presence of so-called State Capitalism with its SOE (State Owned 
Enterprises) all over the world and especially in China is an obvious symptom.
Similar forms of resistance seem only able to delay the inevitable rise of politi-
cal MASs. Unfortunately, they may involve huge risks, not only locally, but also 
globally. Paradoxically, while humanity is moving into a hyperhistorical age, the 
world is witnessing the rise of China, currently a most “historical” Sovereign State, 
and the decline of the US, a Sovereign State that more than any other superpower 
in the past already had a hyperhistorical vocation in its federal organisation. This is 
risky, because the anachronistic historicism of some of China’s policies and human-
ity’s growing hyperhistoricism are heading towards a confrontation. It may not be a 
conflict, but hyperhistory is a force whose time has come, and while it seems very 
likely that it will be the Chinese State that will emerge deeply transformed, one can 
only hope that the inevitable friction will be as painless and peaceful as possible. 
The previous conclusion holds true for the historical State in general: in the future, 
we shall see the political MASs acquire increasing prominence, with the State it-
self progressively abandoning its resistance to hyperhistorical changes and evolving 
into a MAS itself. Good examples are provided by devolution or the growing trend 
in making central banks, like the Bank of England or the European Central Bank, 
independent, public organisations.
4  The Nature and Problems of the Political MAS
The time has come to consider the nature of the political MAS more closely and 
some of the questions that its emergence is already posing.
5 The entry on “List of active separatist movements in Europe” in Wikipedia is both informative 
and eye opening. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_separatist_movements_in_Europe.
6 The Labour Government introduced the first Identity Cards Bill in November 2004, after several 
intermediary stages, the Identity Cards Act was finally repealed by the Identity Documents Act 
2010 on 21 January 2011.
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The political MAS is a system constituted by other systems, which, as a single 
agent (Floridi and Sanders 2004), is
a. teleological, the MAS has a purpose, or goal, which it pursues through its actions;
b. interactive, the MAS and its environment can act upon each other;
c. autonomous, the MAS can change its states without direct response to interac-
tion: it can perform internal transitions to change its states. This imbues the MAS 
with some degree of complexity and independence from its environment; and 
finally
d. adaptable, the MAS’ interactions can change the rules by which the MAS 
changes its states. Adaptability ensures that the MAS learns its own mode of 
operation in a way that depends critically on its experience.
The political MAS is thus an intelligent7 MAS when it implements features a–d 
efficiently and effectively, minimising resources, wastefulness and errors while 
maximising the returns of its actions.
The emergence of intelligent, political MASs poses many serious questions, 
which can only be quickly reviewed here.
4.1  Identity and Cohesion
Throughout history, the State has dealt with the problem of establishing and main-
taining its own identity by working on the equation between State = Nation, often 
through the legal means of Citizenship and the narrative rhetoric of Space (the 
Mother/Father Land) and Time (Story in the sense of traditions, recurrent celebra-
tions of past Nation-building events, etc.). Consider, for example, the invention of 
mandatory military service during the French Revolution, its increasing popularity 
in modern history, but then the decreasing number of Sovereign States that still im-
pose it nowadays. It is a sign of anachronism that, in moments of crisis, Sovereign 
States still give in to the temptation of fuelling nationalism. The equation between 
State, Nation, Citizenship and Land/Story had the further advantage of providing an 
answer to a second problem, that of cohesion, for it answered not just the question 
of who or what the State is, but also the question of who or what belongs to the State 
and hence may be subject to its norms and actions.
New political MAS cannot rely on the same solution. Indeed, they face the fur-
ther problem of having to deal with the decoupling of their political identity and co-
hesion. The political identity of a MAS may be very strong and yet unrelated to its 
temporary and rather loose cohesion, as it is the case with the Tea Party movement 
in the US. Both the identity and cohesion of a political MAS may be rather weak, 
as in the international Occupy movement. Or one may recognise a strong cohesion 
and yet an unclear or weak political identity, as with the population of tweeting 
individuals and their role during the Arab Spring. Both identity and cohesion of 
7 I am using the word ‘intelligent’ here is the same sense in which we find it in Artificial Intelligence, 
that is, as an equivalent to ‘smart’, when used in ‘smart technologies’.
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a political MAS are established and maintained through information sharing. The 
Land is virtualised into the region of the infosphere in which the MAS operates. So 
Memory (retrievable recordings) and Coherence (reliable updates) of the informa-
tion flow enable a political MAS to claim some identity and some cohesion, and 
therefore offer a sense of belonging. But it is, above all, the fact that the boundaries 
between the online and offline are disappearing, the appearance of the onlife experi-
ence, and hence the fact that the virtual infosphere can affect politically the physical 
space, that reinforces the sense of the political MAS as a real agent. If Anonymous 
had only a virtual existence, its identity and cohesion would be much less strong. 
Deeds provide a vital counterpart to the virtual information flow to guarantee cohe-
sion. An ontology of interactions replaces an ontology of things (Floridi 2007).
4.2  Consent
A significant consequence of the breaking up of the equation political MAS = Na-
tion State = Citizenship = Land = Story and of the decoupling of identity and cohe-
sion in a political MAS is that the age-old theoretical problem of how consent to be 
governed by a political authority arises is being turned on its head. In the historical 
framework of social contract theory, the presumed default position is that of a legal 
opt-out: there is some kind (to be specified) of a priori, original consent, allegedly 
given by any individual subject to the political State, to be governed by the latter 
and its laws. The problem is to understand how such consent is given and what hap-
pens when the agent opts out of it (the out-law). In the hyperhistorical framework, 
the expected default position is that of a social opt-in, which is exercised whenever 
the agent subjects itself to the political MAS conditionally, for a specific purpose. 
Gathering consent around specific political issues becomes a continuous process. 
The problem is to understand what may motivate or indeed force agents (again, 
not just individual human beings, but all kinds of agents) to give such consent and 
become engaged, and what happens when such agents, unengaged by default (note, 
not disengaged, for disengagement presupposes a previous state of engagement) 
prefer to stay away from the activities of the political MAS. Failing to grasp the 
previous transformation from historical opt-out to hyperhistorical opt-in means be-
ing less likely to understand the apparent inconsistency between the disenchantment 
of individuals with politics and the popularity of global movements, international 
mobilisations, activism, voluntarism, and other social forces with huge political 
implications. What is moribund is not politics tout court, but historical politics, that 
based on Parties, Classes, fixed Social Roles, and the State, which asked political 
legitimacy only once and spent it until revoked. The inching towards the so-called 
centre by parties in Liberal Democracies around the world and the “Get out the 
vote” strategies (GOTV a term used to describe the mobilisation of voters to ensure 
that those who can do vote) are evidence that engagement needs constantly renewed 
and expanded in order to win an election. Party (as well as Union) membership is a 
Modern feature that is likely to become increasingly less common.
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4.3  Social vs. Political Space
Understanding the previous inversion of default positions means being faced by a 
further problem. Oversimplifying, in prehistory, the social and the political spaces 
overlap because, in a stateless society, there is no real difference between social and 
political relations and hence interactions. In history, the State seeks to maintain such 
co-extensiveness by occupying all the social space politically, thus establishing the 
primacy of the political over the social. We have seen above that this may be based 
on normative or economic strategies, through the exercise of power, force, control, 
and rule-making. In hyperhistory, the social space is the original, default space from 
which agents may move to (consent to) join the political space. It is not accidental 
that concepts such as civil society, public sphere (also in a non-Habermasian sense) 
and community become increasingly important the more we move into a hyper-
historical context. The problem is to understand such social space where agents 
of various kinds are supposed to be interacting and give rise to the political MAS.
Each agent, as described in Sect. 4, has some degrees of freedom. By this I do not 
mean liberty, autonomy or self-determination, but rather, in the robotic sense, some 
capacities or abilities, supported by the relevant resources, to engage in specific 
actions for a specific purpose. To use an elementary example, a coffee machine has 
one degree of freedom: it can make coffee, once the right ingredients and energy 
are supplied. The sum of these agent’s degrees of freedom are its “agency”. When 
the agent is alone, there is of course only agency, no social let alone political space. 
Imagine Robinson Crusoe on his “Island of Despair”. However, as soon as there 
is another agent (Friday on the “Island of Despair”), or indeed a group of agents 
(the native cannibals, the shipwrecked Spaniards, the English mutineers), agency 
acquires the further value of multi-agent (i.e. social) interaction: practices and then 
rules for coordination and constraint of the agents’ degrees of freedom become es-
sential, initially for the well-being of the agents constituting the MAS, and then for 
the well-being of the MAS itself. Note the shift in the level of abstraction: once the 
social space arises, we begin to consider the group as a group—e.g., as a commu-
nity, or as a society—and the actions of the individual agents constituting it become 
elements that lead to the MAS’ newly established degrees of freedom, or agency. 
The previous simple example may still help. Consider now a coffee machine and a 
timer: separately, they are two agents with different agency, but if they are properly 
joined and coordinated into a MAS, then the issuing agent has the new agency to 
make coffee at a set time. It is now the MAS that has a more complex capacity, and 
that may or may not work properly.
A social space is thus the totality of degrees of freedom of the agents one wishes 
to take into consideration. In history, such consideration—which is really just an-
other level of abstraction—was largely determined by the territory and hence by a 
variety of forms of neighbourhood. In the example above, all the agents taken into 
consideration are chosen because of their relations to the same “Island of Despair”. 
We saw that ICTs have changed all this. In hyperhistory, where to draw the line to 
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include, or indeed exclude, the relevant agents whose degrees of freedom constitute 
the social space has become increasingly a matter of at least implicit choice, when 
not of explicit decision. The result is that the phenomenon of distributed morality, 
encompassing that of distributed responsibility, is becoming more and more com-
mon (Floridi forthcoming). In either case, history or hyperhistory, what counts as a 
social space may be a political move. Globalisation is a de-territorialisation in this 
political sense.
If we now turn to the political space in which the new MASs operate, it would 
be a mistake to consider it a separate space, over and above the social one: both 
are determined by the same totality of the agents’ degrees of freedom. The political 
space emerges when the complexity of the social space—understood in terms of 
number and kinds of interactions and of agents involved, and of degree of dynamic 
reconfiguring of both agents and interactions—requires the prevention or resolution 
of potential divergences and the coordination or collaboration about potential con-
vergences. Both are crucial. And in each case more information is required, in terms 
of representation and deliberation about a complex multitude of degrees of freedom. 
The result is that the social space becomes politicised through its informatization.
4.4  Legitimacy
It is when the agents in the social space agree to agree on how to deal with their 
divergences (conflicts) and convergences that the social space acquires the political 
dimension to which we are so used.
Two potential mistakes await us here. One, call it Hobbesian, is to consider poli-
tics merely as the prevention of war by other means. This is not the case, because 
even a complex society of angels ( homo hominis agnus) would still require politics 
in order to further its harmony. Convergences too need politics. Out of metaphor, 
politics is not just about conflicts due to the agents’ exercises of their degree of 
freedom when pursuing their goals. It is also, or at least it should be, above all, 
the furthering of coordination and collaboration by means other than coercion and 
violence. Second, and one may call this potential mistake Rousseauian, it may seem 
that the political space is then just that part of the social space organised by law. In 
this case, the mistake is subtler. We usually associate the political space with the 
rules or laws that regulate it but the latter are not constitutive, by themselves, of 
the political space. Compare two cases in which rules determine a game. In chess, 
the rules do not merely constrain the game, they are the game because they do 
not supervene on a previous activity: rather, they are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that determine all and only the moves that can be legally made. In foot-
ball, however, the rules are constraints because the agents enjoy a previous and 
basic degree of freedom, consisting in their capacity to kick a ball with the foot 
in order to score a goal, which the rules are supposed to regulate. Whereas it is 
physically possible, but makes no sense, to place two pawns on the same square of 
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a chessboard, nothing impeded Maradona’s ‘hand of God’ from scoring a goal,8 and 
that to be allowed by a referee who did not see the infringement.
Once we avoid the previous mistakes, it is easier to see that the political space is 
that area of the social space constrained by the agreement to agree on resolution of 
divergences and coordination of convergences. This leads to a further consideration, 
concerning the Transparent State.
5  The Transparent State
There are two senses in which the State can be transparent. Unsurprisingly, both 
come from ICTs and computer science, one more case in which the information 
revolution is changing our mental framework.
On the one hand, the State can be transparent in the sense that it moves from be-
ing a black box to being a white box. Citizens not only can see inputs and outputs, 
for example levels of tax revenue and public expenditure, they can also monitor 
how the State as a MAS works internally. This is not a novelty at all. It was a prin-
ciple already popularised in the 19th century, when the State as we know it was in 
its infancy. However, it has become a renewed feature of contemporary politics due 
to the possibilities opened up by ICTs. This kind of transparency is also known as 
Open Government.
On the other hand, and this is the more innovative sense that I wish to stress in 
this contribution, the State can be transparent in the same sense in which a technol-
ogy (e.g., an interface) is: invisible not because it is not there but because it delivers 
its services so efficiently, effectively, and reliably that its presence is imperceptible. 
When something works at its best, behind the scenes as it were, to make sure that 
we can operate as easily as possible, then we have a transparent system. This sec-
ond sense of transparency should not be seen as a surreptitious way of introducing, 
with a different terminology, the concept of “Small State” or “Small Governance”. 
On the contrary, in this second sense, the State is as transparent and as vital as the 
oxygen that we breathe. It strives to be the ideal butler. There is no standard termi-
nology for this kind of transparent State that becomes perceivable only when it is 
absent. Perhaps one may speak of Gentle Government. It seems that the State can 
increasingly support the right sort of ethical infrastructure the more transparently 
(that is, openly and gently) it plays the negotiating game through which it takes care 
of the res publica.
8 In Argentina v England (1986 FIFA World Cup), Maradona scored a goal by using his hand. “The 
ball went into the goal. Referee Ali Bin Nasser of Tunisia did not see the infringement and allowed 
the goal, much to the chagrin of the English players and management”, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Argentina_v_England_(1986_FIFA_World_Cup)#.22Hand_of_God.22_goal
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6  Conclusion
Six thousand years ago, a generation of humans witnessed the invention of writing 
and the emergence of the State. This is not accidental. Prehistoric societies are both 
ICT-less and stateless. The State is a typical historical phenomenon. It emerges 
when human groups stop living in small communities a hand-to-mouth existence 
and begin to live a mouth-to-hand one, in which large communities become politi-
cal societies, with division of labour and specialised roles, organised under some 
form of government, which manages resources through the control of ICTs. From 
taxes to legislation, from the administration of justice to military force, from census 
to social infrastructure, the State is the ultimate information agent and so history is 
the age of the State.
Almost halfway between the beginning of history and now, Plato was still trying 
to make sense of both radical changes: the encoding of memories through writ-
ten symbols and the symbiotic interactions between individual and polis–State. In 
50 years, our grandchildren may look at us as the last of the historical, State-run 
generations, not so differently from the way we look at the Amazonian tribes, as the 
last of the prehistorical, stateless societies. It may take a long while before we shall 
come to understand in full such transformations, but it is time to start working on it.9
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